

ACTION

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

March 13, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Lindsey Grant

SUBJECT: MACV Cambodia Assessment

You asked that General Abrams' assessment of the situation in Cambodia be briefed for the President.

I have done so, and added some comments to bring the assessment up-to-date.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

Attachment

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LG:mlr:3/13/70

cc: Mr. McManis

Army, NSS,  
review  
completed

*Did not  
receive orig file  
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INFORMATION

MAR 11 1970

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: MACV Cambodia Assessment

I attach at Tab A a well thought-out assessment of the Cambodia situation done by General Abrams' staff. The assessment makes the following points:

Cambodia's economy is in trouble, principally because rice exports have dropped to zero as a result of Sihanouk's policy of nationalizing the commercial sector. One reason for his decision to reopen relations with us may have been his need for foreign investment and aid. (Incidentally, State took a negative position on aid for Cambodia, in response to your recent request for its views. My staff is working up a set of proposals as to limited things we could do, for your consideration in case you do not agree with State's conclusions.)

For the first time in years, Sihanouk faces concerted resistance to his domestic policies. He permitted the formation of the Lon Nol/Sirik Matak government last August so as to permit others to attempt to straighten out the economic mess without involving his own prestige.

Cambodia's attitude toward operations of VC/NVA forces on Cambodian soil has been hardening for several reasons:

- The Communists do not seem to be winning.
- Under U. S. /GVN pressure, the Communists are establishing more or less permanent enclaves of de facto control in Cambodia.
- The Communists are helping Cambodian insurgents, who are an increasing nuisance.
- Political pressures within Cambodia are building up to do something about the VC/NVA presence.

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- As Vietnamization progresses, the Cambodians face the prospect of fighting on Cambodian soil between the two Vietnamese camps, without the American presence to insure that the Vietnamese will not stay permanently.

The first shift in RKG policy in arms supply to the VC/NVA came in May, 1969, following the failure of the Communist spring offensive and the evidence that you planned to stay in Vietnam as necessary. Some supply may have been resumed in the autumn and Sihanouk's statements suggest that during his trip to Hanoi for the Ho Chi-minh funeral he negotiated a quid pro quo with Pham Van Dong, in which the latter made some promises of withdrawals. Sihanouk seems to be less than happy with Vietnamese performance on that deal. We do not know whether arms are coming through Cambodia at the present time, but the rate of flow is certainly less than in the past.

Aside from domestic reasons for absenting himself (having lost a test with Sirik Matak in parliament in late December), Sihanouk may have decided on his sudden trip to France to avoid a scheduled visit by Pham Van Dong until he could see how the situation was developing.

The study was written before the recent demonstrations against the Communist embassies in Phnom Penh. It is worth noting that the demonstrations followed reports that Sirik Matak had ordered the VC/NVA to remove their troops from Cambodia, and that he concurrently ordered the Cambodian army to drive the Communists out (an impossible task, given Cambodian military resources).

Lon Nol and Sirik Matak were probably reflecting strong nationalistic feelings in Cambodia, but it is still moot whether they cleared their actions with Sihanouk. Given the sharp competition between Sirik Matak and Sihanouk, it is possible that Sirik wanted to present Sihanouk with a fait accompli, or to challenge him to a test on grounds where Sirik Matak's position would be popular. On the other hand, nobody has challenged Sihanouk so directly in years, and it is quite possible that this is an elaborate maneuver, to permit Sihanouk to call for Soviet and Chinese cooperation in urging the VC/NVA to leave, on the grounds that he will fall and be replaced by a "rightist" leader if the VC/NVA stay in Cambodia.

The recent behavior of Sihanouk and the RKG would fit either thesis -- i. e., that this is a collusive gambit; or that Sihanouk in fact faces a

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challenge from Sirik Matak and Lon Nol.

- Sihanouk has publicly claimed that the attacks on Vietnamese installations were "organized by pro-American plotters" and has expressed fears about a "right wing coup."
- He has announced that he will return home via Moscow and Peking, and that he will seek support in those capitals to urge the Vietnamese "to stop interfering in Cambodian affairs and avoid giving the rightists a pretext for seizing power." (He is to arrive in Phnom Penh without formal welcoming ceremonies on Wednesday.)
- He is quoted as calling for a referendum to learn whether the people support him or his challengers.
- The Government in Phnom Penh has called publicly for the withdrawal of VC/NVA troops. It has justified the demonstrators' action, but has called for order.
- Lon Nol has published a message to Sihanouk, justifying the demonstrations, denying any intent to align with SEATO, and calling for Sihanouk's support for a 10,000 man increase in the army. (Sihanouk made negative noises but avoided a direct reply when asked by newsmen if he concurred in the increase.)

Whatever the truth as to domestic power relationships, Cambodian feelings are being stirred up about the Communist presence, and no Cambodian Government will be likely in the future to take so casual a view of it as has been the case in the past.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET-SENSITIVE

February 24, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig  
SUBJECT: MACV Cambodia Assessment

*Holden  
for R. L. B.  
Make summary  
for President*

Attached is General Abrams' Cambodia assessment. The assessment concentrates on the two major shifts which have occurred in Cambodian policy during the past nine months: one in the domestic economy and the other toward the VC/NVA presence in Cambodia. The appraisal makes the following points:

-- Cambodia's economy is in trouble mainly because rice exports have dropped as a result of Sihanouk's policy of nationalizing the commercial sector of the economy. *The need for foreign investment and aid may have been one reason Sihanouk re-opened relations with the US last August.*

-- Cambodia's attitude toward VC/NVA forces operating in her territory hinges on how the war in South Vietnam is progressing. Recent restrictive measures taken by the Cambodians are based almost solely on the realization that the Communists no longer can win the war.

-- Sihanouk is facing concerted resistance to his policies for the first time in a decade.

-- Sihanouk will probably maintain his flexibility and will continue to maneuver in such a way as to maximize his options -- both on the home front and in the diplomatic arena.

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SECRET NOFORN SECTION ONE OF THREE MAC 2439 EYES ONLY  
SUBJECT: THE CURRENT CAMBODIAN SITUATION (S)

1. (SNF) DURING THE PAST WEEK WE HAVE COMPLETED A NEW CAMBODIAN ASSESSMENT WHICH WAS BRIEFED AT THE MACV COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ON 21 FEB 72. IT IS FORWARDED IN ITS ENTIRETY FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

"THE PURPOSE OF THIS BRIEFING IS TO EXAMINE THE EVENTS THAT HAVE OCCURED IN CAMBODIA OVER THE LAST 9 MONTHS. THE EXAMINATION CENTERS AROUND TWO MAJOR SHIFTS IN CAMBODIAN POLICY - ONE IN THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY AND THE OTHER TOWARD VC/NVA PRESENCE IN CAMBODIA. DURING THIS EXPLANATION TWO POINTS SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND. FIRST, THAT THE MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT IS TO PRESERVE ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, SECOND, THAT TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL, SIHANOUK HAS ALWAYS MANEUVERED IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO MAXIMIZE HIS OPTIONS. THE FINAL SECTION OF THIS BRIEF WILL DISCUSS SIHANOUK'S DEPARTURE FOR FRANCE IN TERMS OF MAXIMIZING THESE OPTIONS.  
THE ECONOMY

CAMBODIA'S ECONOMY IS IN SERIOUS TROUBLE. CAMBODIA'S MAJOR PRODUCT IS RICE AND HER RICE EXPORTS HAVE IN THE PAST PROVIDED THE NECESSARY FOREIGN EXCHANGE TO FINANCE THE IMPORTS REQUIRED FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH. OVER THE LAST FIVE YEARS RICE EXPORTS HAVE DROPPED FROM 564, 000 TONS IN 1964 TO PRACTICALLY NOTHING IN 1969. IN FACT, CAMBODIA FOUND IT NECESSARY TO IMPORT RICE IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER OF LAST YEAR TO MEET HER LOCAL MARKET NEEDS AND HER COMMITMENTS TO THE VC/NVA. THE MAJOR CAUSE OF THIS DROP IN EXPORTS HAS BEEN SIHANOUK'S POLICY OF NATIONALIZING THE COMMERCIAL SECTOR OF THE ECONOMY, A POLICY HE IMPLEMENTED IN THE EARLY 1960'S. TWO OTHER EVENTS CAN BE DIRECTLY TIED INTO CAMBODIA'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. FIRST, THE 25 SEPTEMBER 1969 TRADE TREATY WITH THE PRG WAS AN ATTEMPT TO HALT SMUGGLING AND RECOUP LOSSES IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE. SECOND, THE NEED FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND POSSIBLY FOREIGN AID WAS ONE REASON FOR THE RE-OPENING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES ON 15 AUGUST.

WHEN THE LON NOL GOVERNMENT WAS FORMED ON 12 AUGUST 1969,

IT WAS SPECIFICALLY TASKED BY SIHANOUK TO RECTIFY THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY. BY DOING SO SIHANOUK TACTICALLY ADMITTED TO THE FAILURE OF HIS POLICY. HE HAS NOT BEEN QUITE SO CHARITABLE, THOUGH, IN ALLOWING THE GOVERNMENT THE FREE HAND HE HAD PROMISED IT TO CURE THE ECONOMY'S MALADY. THIS FACT HAS SERVED AS A BONE OF CONTENTION BETWEEN ACTING PRIME MINISTER PRINCE SISOVATH SIRIK MATAK AND SIHANOUK. MATAK HAS BEEN SERVING, FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES, AS PRIME MINISTER SINCE THE GOVERNMENT WAS FORMED BECAUSE OF LON NOL'S ALMOST CONTINUAL ABSENCE DUE TO PERSONAL REASONS AND STATE VISITS. RELATIONS BETWEEN SIHANOUK AND SIRIK MATAK RAPIDLY DETERIORATED OVER THE QUESTION OF HOW TO IMPLEMENT THE NECESSARY REFORMS. BETWEEN AUGUST AND THE END OF DECEMBER, SIHANOUK MADE THREE ATTEMPTS TO DISSOLVE THE GOVERNMENT THROUGH POLITICAL MANUEVERING. THE LAST AND MOST SERIOUS, THESE ATTEMPTS TOOK PLACE AT THE MEETING OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS, 27-29 DECEMBER 1969. THIS ATTEMPT FAILED NOT BECAUSE SIHANOUK COULD NOT MUSTER ENOUGH POWER FOR A NEGATIVE VOTE OF CONFIDENCE BUT BECAUSE HE CHOSE NOT TO DO SO. HE MET ENOUGH OPPOSITION TO HIS PROPOSAL THAT HE CHOSE NOT TO LET IT BE SEEN PUBLICLY. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME IN A DECADE THAT SIHANOUK HAS FACED CONCERTED RESISTANCE TO HIS POLICIES. IT WAS SHORTLY AFTER THE END OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS THAT SIHANOUK DEPARTED FOR FRANCE, APPARENTLY LEAVING SIRIK MATAK TO INITIATE THE ECONOMIC REFORMS.

VC/NVA PRESENCE IN CAMBODIA

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MATAK WAS ALSO SEEMINGLY LEFT TO CARRY OUT A NEW POLICY TOWARD THE VC/NVA IN CAMBODIA. THE PREVIOUS POLICY OF COMPLICITY WITH THE VC/NVA WAS SEEMINGLY BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT VC/NVA WOULD TRIUMPH IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IN A RELATIVELY SHORT TIME. PERSONAL GAIN WAS POSSIBLE BY COOPERATING WITH THE VC/NVA, AND PLACATING THEIR AGGRESSIVE NATURE SEEMED SENSIBLE. THE PRESENT SITUATION, AS THE CAMBODIANS NOW SEE IT, IS SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT. FIRST, THE VC/NVA ARE NOT WINNING AND THE WAR HAS BECOME A MUCH LONGER STRUGGLE THAN ORIGINALLY ANTICIPATED. SECOND, ALLIED MILITARY SUCCESSES HAVE CAUSED THE DEVELOPMENT OF LARGE ENCLAVES, PERMANENTLY GARRISONED AND OVER WHICH CAMBODIA HAS LIMITED OR NO SOVEREIGNTY. IN THESE AREAS CAMBODIA IS EXPERIENCING A DE FACTO OCCUPATION OF HER COUNTRY. THIRD, THE VC/NVA ARE DIRECTLY AIDING AN INTERNAL INSURRECTION IN CAMBODIA THAT IS GROWING IN SIZE AND SERIOUSNESS. FOURTH, THE VC/NVA, AND THE INSURGENTS THEY SUPPORT, ARE HARASSING THE LOCAL CAMBODIAN POPULATION TO THE POINT THAT INTERNAL POLITICAL PRESSURE IS BUILDING FOR GOVERNMENT ACTION. FIFTH, WITH DIMINISHING U.S. CONTROL OVER TACTICAL OPERATIONS, THERE IS A GROWING POSSIBILITY THAT THE ARVN WILL ENGAGE THE VC/NVA ON CAMBODIAN SOIL.

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S E C R E T NOFORN SECTION TWO OF THREE MAC 2439 EYES ONLY  
 THIS LAST POINT IS MORE SALIENT NOW THAN IN THE SPRING OF 1969 WHEN THE INITIAL REAPPRAISAL OF THE CAMBODIAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE VC/NVA SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN. EARLY IN 1969 THERE WERE TWO EVENTS THAT CAN BE CONSIDERED TO BE SIGNIFICANT. FIRST, THE CAMBODIANS SAW THAT PRESIDENT NIXON'S POLICY WAS NOT ONE OF UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OR OF CAPITULATION AT THE PARIS PEACE TALKS. THIS INDICATED A CONTINUATION OF AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE SVN AND A PROLONGED WAR. SECOND, THE WINTER-SPRING OFFENSIVE OF 1969 DID NOT ACCOMPLISH ANY SIGNIFICANT MILITARY OR POLITICAL VICTORIES TO INDICATE INCREASED VC/NVA POWER: IN FACT THE SITUATION WAS JUST THE OPPOSITE. IN MAY OF 1969 THE FIRST POSITIVE EVIDENCE OF A CHANGED CAMBODIAN POLICY TOWARD VC/NVA BECAME APPARENT. THIS TOOK THE FORM OF AN EMBARGO ON MAJOR TRANSHIPMENTS OF ARMS FROM THE SUPPLY DEPOTS AT KOMPONG SPEU AND LOVEK. IT IS BELIEVED THAT IT WAS THIS EMBARGO THAT PROMPTED THE VISIT OF PRG PRESIDENT PHAT TO PHNOM PENH ON 30

JUNE. THE EMBARGO LASTED UNTIL MID-SEPTEMBER.

SIHANOUK DECIDED TO END THE EMBARGO DURING THE TALKS HELD WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WHILE HE WAS ATTENDING THE FUNERAL OF HO CHI MINH, 8-10 SEPTEMBER 1969. IT IS SPECULATED THAT THE RELEASE OF THE ARMS WAS A RESULT OF A QUID PRO QUO ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY THE VC/NVA WERE 1) TO CONFINE THEIR ACTIVITIES TO SPECIFIED ENCLAVES WHOSE BOUNDARIES WOULD NOT BE CONTIGUOUS WITH THE BORDER IN ORDER NOT TO INVITE US/ARVN INTRUSION OR FIRE 2) TO STOP AIDING THE KHMER ROUGE AND KHMER LOEU INSURGENTS AND 3) TO STOP HARASSING THE LOCAL CAMBODIAN POPULATION. ON HIS RETURN FROM HANOI SIHANOUK SAID "...PHAM VAN DON PROMISED ME A GREAT DEAL. IF HE DOES NOT KEEP HIS PROMISES 100 PERCENT, THEN 70 PERCENT OR EVEN 30 PERCENT IS BETTER THAN NOTHING... (PHAM VAN DONO) SAID THAT HE WOULD EVEN STOP SUPPORTING THE ENI No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/02 : LOC-HAK-4-5-21-8



IT APPEARS THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE NOT EVEN KEPT 30 PERCENT OF THEIR WORD IN SIHANOUK'S ESTIMATION. ON 15 DECEMBER SIHANOUK MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT REFERENCING THE DAK DAM INCIDENT OF MID-NOVEMBER "WHO TRIGGERED THE DAK DAM INCIDENT? IT WAS THE VIET CONG WHO FIRED AT THE AMERICANS FROM OUR TERRITORY. WHEN THE AMERICANS GOT HIT, THEY BECAME ANGRY AND BOMBED US. THEN THE VIET CONG AND THE VIET MINH FLED, AND ONLY KHMER INHABITANTS WERE LEFT TO BECOME VICTIMS. THAT IS THE WHOLE STORY." SIHANOUK WENT ON TO SAY "IF WE RUPTURE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH (THE AMERICANS) THEN WE WILL HAVE TO DO THE SAME THING WITH THE VIET MINH AND THE VIET CONG, BECAUSE THEY STILL CONTINUE TO COMMIT AGGRESSION AGAINST OUR TERRITORY EVEN AFTER WE ESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THEM."

A MORE SIGNIFICANT STATEMENT EXPRESSING THE FEAR OF COMMUNIST INTENT TOWARD CAMBODIA IS AN EDITORIAL BY SIHANOUK WHICH APPEARED IN TWO SEPARATE GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS. IN REFERENCE TO THE ATTITUDES OF THE CHINESE AND VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS TOWARD CAMBODIA, SIHANOUK STATED THAT "NO MATTER HOW POPULAR THE GOVERNMENT AND SANGKUM ARE IN CAMBODIA, WE WILL ALWAYS BE CLASSIFIED IN THE CATEGORY OF REACTIONARY REGIMES AND LEADERS WHICH ARE ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE AND MUST BE OVERTHROWN. THEREFORE, NEW CHINA, SOCIALIST VIETNAM, AND OTHER COMMUNIST POWERS WILL BE NEITHER ABLE NOR WILLING TO HELP US IN RESPECT TO SETTLING THE PROBLEMS OF THE KHMER RED'S REBELLION AND THE VIET CONG AND VIET MINH INFILTRATION AND OCCUPATION OF OUR TERRITORY. THIS AS EVERYBODY KNOWS, IS BECAUSE THE COMMUNIST'S SPECIAL POLICY IS TO PROMOTE, BY ALL POSSIBLE MEANS, THE COMMUNIZATION OF COUNTRIES WHICH ARE NOT YET THEIR IDEOLOGICAL BROTHERS EVEN THOUGH THESE COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN OFFICIALLY QUALIFIED AS FRIENDS." HE CONTINUED "IF THE VIETNAM WAR...DRAGS ON FOR LONG, THE FUTURE WILL BE RATHER GLOOMY SINCE WE ARE CAUGHT BETWEEN THE HAMMER AND THE ANVIL. PRESSURES WILL PROBABLY BUILD UP ON AND WITHIN OUR UNFORTUNATE COUNTRY, MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR IT TO MAINTAIN ITS NEUTRALITY..." THIS SPEECH STRONGLY SUGGESTS A CONTINUATION OF THE POLICY OF ATTEMPTING TO RESTRICT THE ACTIVITIES AND TO CONTROL THE PRESENCE OF THE VC/NVA IN CAMBODIA. TWO OF THE MOST DIRECT INDICATORS OF SUCH A DECISION ARE THE ACTIVITIES OF FARK AGAINST THE VC/NVA, AND THE GOVERNMENT POSITION ON ARMS SHIPMENTS THROUGH SIHANOUKVILLE.

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S E C R E T NOFORN FINAL SECTION OF THREE MAC 2439 EYES ONLY  
 FARK OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VC/NVA HAVE BEEN INTENSIFIED  
 IN RECENT MONTHS. SIRIK MATAK, IN FACT, HAS ORDERED FARK  
 TO "ATTACK VC/NVA TROOPS LOCATED WITHIN THE BORDERS OF  
 CAMBODIA." ALTHOUGH MATAK'S ORDER IS RATHER EMPHATIC,  
 FARK OPERATIONS, IN REALITY, HAVE NOT BEEN CONDUCTED IN  
 SUCH A MANNER AS TO RESULT IN DIRECT LARGE SCALE CONFRONT-  
 ATIONS WITH THE VC/NVA. FARK EFFORTS HAVE BEEN PRIMARILY  
 DESIGNED TO REESTABLISH CAMBODIAN SOVEREIGNTY IN AREAS  
 WHICH THE VC/NVA ARE WILLING TO VACATE, TO IMPEDE FURTHER  
 INFILTRATION, AND TO RESTRICT VC/NVA ACTIVITIES TO SPECIFIED  
 ENCLAVES. ASSOCIATED WITH THESE MANEUVERS HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTS  
 TO ELIMINATE KHMER ROUGE AND KHMER LOEU WHO OPERATE IN THE  
 SAME AREAS AS THE VC/NVA. THE FACT THAT INSURGENTS ARE GEN-  
 ERALLY SHOT WHILE VC/NVA PRISONERS ARE USUALLY RETURNED  
 TO THE PRG EMBASSY IN PHNOM PENH IS EVIDENCE OF THE  
 DIFFERENT OBJECTIVES INVOLVED IN EACH OPERATION.

THE POLICY OF THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE MATTER OF  
 ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE VC/NVA CANNOT BE PRECISELY DETER-  
 MINED AT THIS TIME. AT PRESENT, INTELLIGENCE IS INSUFFI-  
 CIENT TO CONFIRM OR DENY WHETHER ARMS AND AMMUNITION ARE  
 STILL COMING INTO SIHANOUKVILLE. THE SHIPPING PATTERN  
 ESTABLISHED OVER THE LAST THREE YEARS HAS BEEN THE ARRIVAL  
 OF ONE ARMS CARGO APPROXIMATELY EVERY THREE MONTHS. THE  
 ONLY PREVIOUS EXCEPTION TO THIS PATTERN WAS AN EXTRA SHIP  
 PRIOR TO TET 1968. EVEN THOUGH SHIPS KNOWN TO HAVE CARRIED  
 ARMS AND AMMUNITION IN THE PAST CONTINUE TO ARRIVE AT  
 SIHANOUKVILLE ON A QUARTERLY BASIS, THE LAST CONFIRMED ARMS  
 SHIPMENT WAS IN JULY, 1969.

IN VIEW OF THE LACK OF CONFIRMED INTELLIGENCE SINCE JULY,  
 THREE POSSIBILITIES EXIST: (1) ARMS SHIPMENTS INTO  
 SIHANOUKVILLE ARE CONTINUING AS USUAL, BUT CARGOS HAVE NOT  
 BEEN DETERMINED. (2) BECAUSE OF THE PREVIOUS ARMS EMBARGO,  
 THE COMMUNISTS MAY BE HESITANT TO COMMIT LARGE QUANTITIES  
 OF ARMS TO THE CONTROL OF THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT. (3) IT  
 IS POSSIBLE THAT CAMBODIA IS NOT PERMITTING ARMS -- OR AT  
 LEAST ONLY LIMITED AMOUNTS OF ARMS -- TO BE UNLOADED IN  
 SIHANOUKVILLE.